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Financial derivative contracts have been criticized for
their role in the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The opacity
of such contracts – and the fact that they are often un-
regulated or traded over-the-counter (OTC) – has drawn
criticism, in particular to credit default swaps (CDSs).
CDSs were created in the 1990s as a risk management
tool, by which a loan could be insured against default
risk. Their use is however mostly speculative and has
drastically increased since the early 2000s.
Within an interbank system, CDSs have the effect of
transferring a financial exposure from one institution to
another. They can thus be used to change the topology
of the interbank network. It is now known that differ-
ent financial network topologies have different impacts on
the probability of systemic collapse. As a network prop-
erty, systemic risk can be quantified by metrics such as
DebtRank. Managing systemic risk thus reduces to the
problem of re-shaping the topology of financial networks.
In this article, we present a multi-layer model of the
interbank system, which allows us to study how CDSs
affect the topology of exposures between the banks. The
different layers represent different types of contractual
obligations (loans, derivatives) and we show that insol-
vency cascades can spread through these different layers
in non-standard ways.
We then show that a CDS market can be designed to
rewire the network of interbank exposures in a way that
makes it more resilient to insolvency cascades. Banks
are exposed to each other through interbank loans re-
sulting from the conduct of normal banking operations
(layer ‘0’ in Fig. 1). To guard against the risk of de-
fault of a counter-party on a given loan, a bank can then
buy a CDS contract from another bank (layers ‘1’ to ‘7’
in Fig. 1). A regulator can use information about the
topology of the interbank network to predict how a CDS
contract between two banks contributes to increasing or
decreasing systemic risk. She can then devise a systemic
surcharge that is added to the CDS spread. This consti-
tutes a mechanism that effectively ‘taxes’ CDS contracts
according to how they contribute to increasing systemic
risk. Contracts that decrease systemic risk remain un-
taxed. This mechanism has the effect of ‘matching’ CDS
FIG. 1. A multi-layer network representing the interbank system.
In this example, the interbank system is composed of 7 banks. Layer
0 represents the layer of net loan exposure between those banks.
Each of the other 7 layers represents the layer of net CDS exposures
on a particular reference entity (bank).
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FIG. 2. Systemic Risk in 3 Different Scenarios. The case of an
interbank system composed of 20 banks without a CDS market is
shown in blue. The case of this interbank system with a regulated
CDS market is shown in green while the case of this interbank
system with an unregulated CDS market is shown in red. Plot (a)
shows the histogram of aggregated losses resulting from insolvency
cascades in each scenario. Plot (b) show the DebtRanks (i.e. the
systemic importance) of the 20 banks in each scenario.
counter-parties in a way that reduces systemic risk.
We simulate this regulated CDS market using an agent-
based model (CRISIS macro-financial model) and demon-
strate how it leads to a self-organized re-structuring of the
interbank system that it considerably more resilient to in-
solvency cascades. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 (a), where
aggregate losses to the interbank system (here composed
of 20 banks) resulting from insolvency cascades are shown
to be considerably decreased when the CDS market is reg-
ulated as described previously (shown in green). On the
other hand, the situation becomes much worse when the
CDS market is unregulated (shown in red) and banks are
allowed to speculate by buying ‘naked’ CDSs, i.e. CDSs
that are not used as insurance on an underlying loan.
Fig. 2 (b) shows the corresponding DebtRanks (i.e. the
systemic importance) of the 20 banks in each of the three
different scenarios. We can clearly see that by increasing
the number of contagion channels, an unregulated CDS
market considerably increases the systemic riskiness of
each bank. On the other hand, by properly transferring
exposures from one bank to another, the proposed tax
mechanism creates an interbank system in which each
institution is considerably less systemically risky.
